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This brief article is a discussion-starter on the question of 
the role and use of theories and philosophies of history. 
In the last few decades, theories of history typically 
intended to transform the practice of historical studies 
through a straightforward application of their insights. 
Contrary to this, I argue that they either bring about 
particular historiographical innovations in terms of 
methodology but leave the entirety of historical studies 
intact or change the way we think about the entirety 
of historical studies merely by describing and explaining 
it in fresh and novel ways, without the need (and 
possibility) of application. In the former case, theories 
appear as internal to historical studies. In the latter case, 
they appear as theories about history, and such theories 
are no longer limited to study history understood as 
historical writing. In reflecting on the historical condition 
of the ever-changing world, they foster a more fruitful 
cooperative relationship with the discipline of history. 
Discussing the scope and use of such theories of history 
is inevitable today when a younger generation sets out to 
theorize history against the backdrop of the experiential 
horizon of their own times.
Theory of History; Philosophy of History, Historiography.
Este breve artigo faz uma discussão inicial sobre o papel 
e o uso de teorias e filosofias da história. Nas últimas
décadas, as teorias da história em geral pretenderam 
transformar a prática dos estudos históricos por meio 
de uma aplicação direta de seus insights. Em vez disso, 
argumento que essas teorias ou trazem inovações 
historiográficas particulares em termos de metodologia, 
mas deixam a totalidade dos estudos históricos intactos, 
ou transformam a maneira como nós pensamos sobre 
a totalidade dos estudos históricos apenas descrevendo 
e explicando-os através de formas novas e inovadoras, 
sem a necessidade (e possibilidade) de aplicação. No 
primeiro caso, as teorias parecem internas aos estudos 
históricos. No último, elas parecem como teorias sobre 
a história, e tais teorias não estão mais limitadas a 
estudar a história entendida como escrita da história. 
Ao refletir sobre a condição histórica do mundo em 
constante mudança, elas promovem uma relação 
cooperativa mais frutífera com a disciplina da história. 
Discutir o escopo e o uso de tais teorias da história 
é inevitável hoje, quando uma geração mais jovem se 
propõe a teorizar a história contra o pano de fundo do 
horizonte experiencial de seus próprios tempos.
Teoria da História; Filosofia da História; Historiografia.
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Are you fascinated by questions of historical knowledge? 
Are you engaged in mapping the narrative strategies of 
history? Or do rather do you rather ask yourself lately how 
the Anthropocene and visions of a posthuman future might 
transform whatever we think history is? Perhaps you find it 
more important to explore the ways in which the category of 
gender pervades historical practice. Or maybe you just give a 
pause to questions concerning historical studies and venture 
into theorizing something like a historical process. Perhaps you 
are fascinated by discourses of memory and trauma and by 
the question of how they relate to history. Or do you have a 
methodological proposal instead? Do you theorize global history, 
environmental history, or postcolonial history? Are you a conceptual 
historian? Do you plan to announce a “turn” in historical studies 
or to contribute to one? Maybe you did that already.
If you are and if you do or did, then most likely you think of 
yourself the same way as most likely your colleagues think of you, 
namely, as someone being engaged in what is commonly called 
historical theory. Or theory of history. Or philosophy of history. Or, 
all this taken together: the theory and philosophy of history. This 
is the intellectual activity I am usually engaged in too, and this is 
the activity that puzzles me a lot. Not only when I actually pursue 
it, but also when I try to explain what it is what I actually do while 
pursuing it in the first decades of the 21st century.
The difficulties begin right away with naming the activity 
itself as a field of study. The three most popular alternatives 
are, as indicated above, historical theory, theory of history, 
and philosophy of history. Yet it would be mistaken to argue 
that these three terms are equivalent in their current usage. 
They seem to overlap in many ways, but they also differ in 
many others, most apparently regarding their scope in terms 
of inclusivity and exclusivity. In reviewing the options, Herman 
Paul opts for “historical theory” in his introductory book for 
undergraduate students precisely for inclusiveness reasons 
(PAUL 2015). In Paul’s view, the inclusivity largely stems from 
the possibility to overcome a view of “philosophy of history” that 
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sharply distinguishes between its “speculative” and “critical” 
(WALSH 1960) or “substantive” and “analytical” versions 
(DANTO 1985). And Paul, I think, makes a call that suits the 
purpose of inclusivity on multiple levels. For the distinctions 
were introduced by analytic philosophers in the postwar 
decades with the intention to legitimize a study of historical 
knowledge and delegitimize speculating about anything like a 
historical process. They are not merely about what constitutes 
“proper” philosophy, but also about what is the “proper” sense 
of the word history. Whereas old speculative and substantive 
philosophies of history were engaged in mapping history 
understood as the unitary course of human affairs, a legitimate 
critical or analytical philosophy of history would study history 
understood as historical studies (or, in a wider sense, any 
practices that claim to produce historical knowledge, including 
old philosophies of history). Overcoming the distinction by 
“historical theory” would then imply at least a renegotiation of 
the relationship between the two senses of the word “history”. 
Yet things are a bit more complicated than this. For 
what seems to be a desirable term for Paul because of its 
integrative potential might look desirable for others precisely 
because of its potential for exclusivity. The latter potentiality 
is what informs Nancy Partner’s take on the issue as the co-
editor of The SAGE Handbook of Historical Theory. Partner 
distinguishes between “philosophy of history” and “theory” 
considering the different senses of history, claiming that 
whereas the former deals with the historical process, the 
restricted sense of “historical theory” should concern only 
matters of the discipline of history (PARTNER 2013, p. 2). She 
thereby posits a divide not only between the different senses of 
history, but also between “philosophy” and “theory” (although 
the distinction suspiciously resembles the distinction of analytic 
philosophers, with “theory” standing for the legitimate and 
“philosophy” standing for the illegitimate).
The situation arising out of Partner’s and Paul’s stances is 
rather uncomfortable. By mentioning only two different takes 
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on a single term – “historical theory” – multiple divisions already 
come to light: between different understandings of “philosophy 
of history”, between different senses of “history” as historical 
studies or as the course of human affairs, between “philosophy” 
and “theory”. Reviewing even more variations and eventually 
solving the naming problem, however, is not the purpose of 
this essay (see SIMON; KUUKKANEN 2015). Instead, on the 
following pages I will refer to a field of study in the most inclusive 
terms. I will refer to it as the theory and philosophy of history 
that somehow encompasses all the different understandings of 
“theory”, “philosophy”, and “history”, and I will explain what I 
think this field of study already is. Not because I wish to reveal 
the true nature of the theory and philosophy of history, but 
because it seems to me that the time is ripe for a discussion 
about what theories and philosophies of history may and may 
not achieve today, with special attention to the question of how 
they relate to historical studies. 
Nevertheless, there is value in the quick look at the 
confusion about naming: it attests to the fact that the field of 
study whose name is in question barely exists institutionally. 
The field itself is not a subfield of any existing institutionalized 
discipline, and job openings in “theory of history”, “historical 
theory”, or “philosophy of history” are more seldom than 
heartwarming deeds in Game of Thrones. Individual approaches 
and projects that constitute a part of the wider field of the 
theory and philosophy of history are nevertheless hosted 
by various university departments. History departments at 
most universities offer methodological courses and courses in 
historiography (as the study of the history of historical studies) 
that may optionally include theories in history. A few analytic 
philosophers can, in principle, maintain an engagement in 
“philosophy of history” at philosophy departments as one of 
their focuses. In the last decades, departments of English and 
(comparative) literature routinely discussed themes that overlap 
with themes discussed in the theory and philosophy of history 
(like that of historical narratives). Such thematic overlaps and 
partial inclusions in educational and research profiles, however, 
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do not create a shared sense of institutional or disciplinary 
integrity; on the contrary, they create institutional division and 
sometimes even intellectual discord from institutional divisions.
But defying the rigid institutional landscape may not be a 
bad thing after all, if the theory and philosophy of history can 
achieve integrity by other means. So is there anything that could 
create a sense that the theory and philosophy of history may 
constitute a field of study in the first place? I believe there is. For 
despite all disagreements about naming (disagreements about 
questions of inclusion and exclusion) and despite the lack of 
formal institutional and disciplinary integrity, I think that there 
are two major centripetal factors that generate a sense that 
there may be a wider field of study in the most inclusive terms.
The first factor is the ongoing discussion that takes place not 
only at conferences and workshops, but also in certain common 
venues. Analytic philosophies of history, philosophical takes on 
history as the course of human affairs, methodological treatises, 
histories of history, critical theories of historical work, conceptual 
works on the notion of history, questions of postcolonial and gender 
theory in and as history, and several other diverging approaches 
meet on the pages of journals ranging from History and Theory 
through Historein, Rethinking History, the Journal of the Philosophy 
of History and Storia della Storiografia to this very journal. Behind 
this ongoing discussion lies the second centripetal factor, namely, 
the informal and quasi-formal networks, centers and hubs. Without 
aiming at providing a full list, you can think of the most integrative 
International Network for Theory of History in Ghent, the more 
focused research seminar in philosophy of history at the Institute 
of Historical Research in London, the Centre for Philosophical 
Studies of History in Oulu, the Metahistorias group and research 
program in Buenos Aires with a history of almost two decades, 
the Sociedade Brasileira de Teoria e História da Historiografia 
(Brazilian Society for Theory and History of Historiography) 
in Brazil with a focus on the history of historiography, or the 
Zentrum for Theorien in der Historischen Forschung (Center for 
Theories in Historical Research) recently launched in Bielefeld.
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The pioneering work of a previous generation of eminent 
scholars may have led to the existence of all this. However, in 
the first decades of the new century, a younger generation is 
pulling the diverging threads together and trying to establish 
common platforms for exchanging ideas about history. These 
centripetal factors may be accompanying phenomena of a wider 
reorientation of the field of the theory and philosophy of history, 
which would hardly be surprising news to any historians. For 
not only history as historiography changes – of which historians are 
very well aware (SPIEGEL 2007; HUGHES-WARRINGTON 2013) – 
but its theory and philosophy changes too.
The changes in the theoretical field may or may not interact 
with historiographical changes. In fact, the overall question of 
the relationship between the theoretical field and historical 
work is precisely what is at stake in the wider exchange of 
ideas about history in the aforementioned common platforms. 
As soon as you enter the exchange, you take on the scholarly 
role of a theorist of history, defined by your very engagement 
in that widely construed exchange. And it is, I believe, the 
actions emerging from the scholarly role that constitute the 
field of the theory and philosophy of history, and the field itself 
is held together by the abovementioned shared platforms and 
networks of exchange, giving a certain degree of integrity and 
coherence to an otherwise barely institutionalized field of study. 
But then, if the formal institutional situation is not decisive, the 
following question arises: what does it mean to take on the 
role of a theorist of history? What do you do as a theorist of 
history? Are you at least expected to develop or hold “a theory 
of history”? Or, to put it preposterously simply, do theorists of 
history necessarily have a theory of history?
To answer this question, first I must answer the question 
about what “a theory of history” might be. As I see it, a theory 
of history is precisely what it grammatically is: it is a theory; 
and it is a theory of history. A theory of history is no more 
the theory of history than Foucault’s The History of Sexuality 
(FOUCAULT 1978–1986) really is the history of sexuality (even 
59
Do Theorists of History Have a Theory of History? Reflections on a Non-Discipline 
Hist. Historiogr. v. 12, n. 29, jan-abr, ano 2019, p. 53-68 - DOI: 10.15848/hh.v12i29.1461
if hardcore fans of Foucault may treat it as if it really was), while 
the “of” in the phrase “a theory of history” can be interpreted 
in two major ways. First, it can mean a theory that belongs to 
history, in which history is understood only as the discipline. In 
this sense, a theory of history is a theory internal to or internalized 
by the practice of history, and the term “theory” is very loosely 
defined. So loosely that in fact it is not defined at all, usually being 
regarded as a methodology like Skinnerian intellectual history, 
an approach like the currently fashionable global history, critical 
theories as appropriated to historiography like postcolonial theory 
and postcolonial history, a long-term historical interpretation (like 
“theories” of modernization or secularization), or any mixture of 
these and other internal or internalized theories.
Some of these are compatible with each other while 
some are not. But in principle you have a choice about them, 
and your choice does not imply a normative statement that 
would concern the entire discipline. Although there certainly 
are dominant internal theoretical choices at certain times in 
certain environments, if you choose to write a microhistory, 
it simply does not imply that the entirety of historical studies 
should transform into microhistory. The same way – just to 
have a timelier example –, if you choose to write a global 
history, it does not imply that all your colleagues should follow 
suit and write only global histories from now on, despite all 
appearances. The particularity of internal theoretical choices 
is even better illuminated by a combination of such choices. 
If your global history is also an environmental history that 
appropriates insights of postcolonial history as informed by 
postcolonial theory, then you certainly would not think that 
your internal theories of history should be of universal validity 
for the entire discipline. Or, to have a concrete example, if 
you think with Angelika Epple that practice theory may solve 
some challenges of writing global history (EPPLE 2018), then 
you definitely would not think that practice theory should be 
integrated to all historical approaches. Most likely, you would 
not even think that the adoption of practice theory is a solution 
for all varieties within that particular historical approach called 
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global history. Plainly put, having “a theory of history” in this 
sense is a matter of particular choices. Although these choices 
bring about changes within the discipline, they do not change 
the entire discipline.
The case is very different when considering the second 
major interpretation of the phrase “a theory of history”, meaning 
a theory about history. Here history can mean both historical 
studies and the course of human affairs, and a theory about 
any of them clearly implies a universality claim. What this 
universality claim means is that a theory of history as a theory 
about history demands validity concerning all historical practices 
the discipline consists of (if you talk about history as historical 
studies), and it demands validity concerning an overall view of 
the changing world of human affairs (if you are among the few 
theorists of history who are willing to talk about such things). 
In the last few decades, theorizing about history dominantly 
fell into the former category. Although a revival of theorizing 
history as the changing world of human affairs might very well 
prove to be the much-needed refreshment in the theory and 
philosophy of history, for now, “a theory of history” as a theory 
about history still has the primary focus on historical writing. 
Such a theory of history (as historiography) explains history 
on a level so general that is indifferent to the methodological 
plurality of historical approaches. Notwithstanding the fact that 
methodological treatises are usually also labeled as “theory”, 
a theory about history explains or understands history (both 
as historiography and as the changing world of human affairs) 
regardless of the particular ways historians have or invent to 
satisfy their particular curiosities (methods), and regardless of 
the curiosities themselves (specific study subjects).
Just like an internal theory of history, a theory of history 
in this sense also brings about changes regarding history. But 
unlike an internal theory of history, its function is not to bring 
about a change within the discipline.1 Instead, it changes the 
entire discipline by describing and explaining it in a fresh way 
that sheds a new light on what previously has been thought 
1 - This may never-
theless happen in a 
certain way to which 
I will come back la-
ter. For now, what I 
would like to point out 
is only that this possi-
bility does not derive 
from the constitution 
of any theory about 
history; it comes as a 
consequence of histo-
rians making use of a 
theory about history 
and internalizing it as 
a particular approach.
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about history. The most obvious example here is theoretical work 
on history as narrative, inspired either by analytic philosophy 
or the work of Hayden White. Whereas theories that belong 
to historical studies are responsible for the inner orientation 
of the discipline, theories about history may change the self-
image of the entire discipline and thus orient the discipline in 
its outer relation to other disciplines.
The same goes for a theory of history as a theory about 
history which concerns history as the changing world of human 
affairs: it may change whatever has been previously thought 
about historical change by conceptualizing novel ways in 
which the past, present and future relate to each other. This 
latter case entails what I think is the most fruitful relationship 
between theories and philosophies of history and historical 
studies. Rather than merely discussing the work of the discipline 
of history, theories of history can, in principle, work together 
with historical studies on developing ways to understand the 
historical condition of ourselves and the world. Not instead of 
theorizing the work of historical studies but supplementing it; 
and not in a way that revives classical philosophies of history as 
large-scale interpretations of an overall historical process, but 
in novel ways that evade the much-criticized presuppositions 
of those philosophies of history, such as teleology, ultimate 
meaning, or linear temporality.
The old-fashioned distinctions between “critical” and 
“speculative” or “analytical” and “substantive” philosophy of 
history are, in fact, already overwritten today in a variety of 
ways. The case is not that the distinctions merely lost their 
appeal; what occurs is that the categories of these distinctions 
cannot adequately capture the character of much of recent 
theoretical work on history. To one extent or another, they simply 
do not apply to a vast amount of work on historical time (as 
recently reviewed by FARELD 2016) and related topics such as 
periodization and chronology (LORENZ 2017; JORDHEIM 2019); 
to François Hartog’s analysis of “regimes of historicity” 
(HARTOG 2015); to Berber Bevernage’s call for a philosophy 
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of historicity (BEVERNAGE 2012); to Eelco Runia’s philosophy 
of history (RUNIA 2014); to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s efforts to 
understand the historicity brought forth by the Anthropocene 
predicament (CHAKRABARTY 2009; 2018); and hopefully to 
my half-decade work on “unprecedented change” as a novel 
kind of historical change (culminating in SIMON 2019). 
Instead of being “analytical” and “critical” or “speculative” and 
substantive” philosophies of history, all these theories wish to 
explore an entire historical condition, which provides a shared 
object of study with historical studies on the one hand and 
implies a theory of historical studies on the other (by virtue 
of the fact that the discipline of history necessarily operates 
under the historical condition explored by these theories).
Now, why does it seem to be important to point all this 
out? First, because we witnessed a theoretical excess in the 
last decades without substantially reflecting upon what theory 
might be able to achieve, or more precisely, without discussing 
which notion of theory could achieve what. Second, because 
a recent collaborative intervention of the Wild On Collective 
(Ethan Kleinberg, Joan Scott, and Gary Wilder) – an online 
manifesto entitled Theses on Theory and History – intends to 
rekindle debates on the theoretical conduct of historical studies, 
or the lack thereof (WILD ON COLLECTIVE 2018).
The ideas at the core of theoretical debates in the last half-
century were ideas of “a theory of history” that tried to explain the 
entirety of historical studies. Yet they were often conflated with 
(at best) and mistaken for (at worst) internal theories of history 
and expected to transform the practice of historical studies. 
“Postmodern” theories of history were especially prone to such 
expectations. Both its advocates and opponents thought that the 
measure of success of such overall theories must be their ability 
to bring about a spectacular change not merely by describing and 
explaining the entire discipline in a fresh way but also by applying 
its insights. As Ernst Breisach put it, their success seemed to 
depend on “whether life would conform or could be made to 
conform to theoretical expectations” (BREISACH 2003, p. 202). 
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But such thing simply could not have happened. For how 
could a theory that explains the entirety of historiography 
require any practical conformation to its terms on behalf of 
historiography if what such a theory claims is precisely what 
historiography already is as theory describes it? No particular 
history can conform to a universal theoretical notion such as the 
notion of non-referential language. If you subscribe to a theory 
of history that advocates such a view on language, you already 
consider every history ever written since the institutionalization 
of historical studies as having a non-referential language. How 
could you expect a transformation of historical practice to result 
in non-referential written histories if you think that all written 
histories are non-referential anyways? To have a concrete 
example in the shape of postmodern calls for such overall 
transformations,2 when Munslow defined “written history as a 
socially constituted narrative representation that recognizes 
the ultimate failure of that narrative form to represent either 
accurately or objectively” (MUNSLOW 1997, p. 17), then all 
histories ever written and all histories yet to be written should 
have appeared to him as so. And if written history is already 
so, then the imperative of turning it into that which it already is 
amounts to an unintelligible enterprise. Paternalizing historical 
practice by demanding conformation to overall theoretical 
definitions of historical studies only creates rifts between 
historical studies and theories about history, despite the fact 
that it simply makes no difference whether historians accept 
the overall definition or not. From the viewpoint of such a 
theory, history will be as the definition claims, regardless of 
what historians think about it.
It is nevertheless possible to be inspired by such theories 
about history, just as much as by any other theory. To begin 
with, consider the way Quentin Skinner internalized speech 
act theory (SKINNER 2002). Skinner turned to universal 
philosophical notions about language, that is, to notions that 
describe language use without temporal and spatial confines. 
What Wittgenstein said about language and meaning, and what 
J. L. Austin said about the performative function of language, 
2 - For a relatively 
late call see BOWEN 
RADDEKER, 2007. 
For an earlier one see 
JENKINS 1991.
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Skinner took as being valid concerning a subcase of the general 
case: the language in which his sources has been written. In 
doing so, Skinner construed a subject of study that intended to 
explore what certain political theorists had been doing through 
writing political theories (that is, through their performative 
speech acts), and he devised a method that he thought was 
best suited for studying the subject in question. In other 
words, Skinner took a theory demanding universality regarding 
all speech acts regardless of temporal and spatial confines, 
and turned its insights into an internal theory of history, as a 
method in the history of ideas.
On the same premise, even a theory about history can 
be internalized (thus becoming a particular approach among 
the many existing ones), and if it takes root, it may result 
in changes within the discipline. This is precisely what Ann 
Rigney did in mapping various narrative representations of 
the French Revolution (RIGNEY 1990), or what experimental 
histories did in exploring new ways of writing history and 
new representational forms inspired by narrativist insights 
(MUNSLOW; ROSENSTONE 2004). Yet, as Frank Ankersmit 
pointed out, each experiment, if it wishes to qualify as 
experimental, must be unique even when compared to other 
experiments. Even if taken together they may qualify as a 
“specific class” of historical studies, to remain experimental 
they need other forms of historical studies to differ from 
(ANKERSMIT 2007, p. 181). Explained in the terms of this 
essay, experimental history may bring about particular changes 
within historical studies by internalizing and particularizing a 
general theory about history, but only as an internalized theory 
of history and not as a theory about history.
These are then, I think, the two major senses of “a theory 
of history”: a theory that belongs to history as historical studies 
and constitutes a specific method or approach, and a theory 
about the entirety of history understood either as historical 
studies or the changing world of human affairs (or a theory 
about both).3 Acting in the role of a theorist of history might 
3 - It is also possib-
le to say that internal 
theories of history are 
theories in history as 
opposed to theories 
of history which are 
about history. This 
is how, in negotia-
ting the character of 
events organized by 
the Zentrum in Bie-
lefeld, we often dis-
tinguished between 
them. Yet, when the 
aim is to achieve the 
integrity of the the-
ory and philosophy 
of history as an in-
clusive field of study, 
the “in” and “of” in-
troduces yet another 
unnecessary division 
that could easily be 
turned into means of 
separating theoreti-
cal work concerning 
history into two rigid 
fields. For this rea-
son, I would keep on 
arguing for a shared 
sense of “a theory of 
history” that consists 
of two occasionally in-
tertwining subcases, 
referring to internal 
theories of history and 
theories about the en-
tirety of history.
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result in developing “a theory of history” of either type, as 
Skinner’s and Munslow’s examples show. And as the case of 
experimental history indicates, these two senses of “a theory 
of history” may even interact. But the main point I would like 
to make is that acting in the role of a theorist of history means 
committing – either explicitly or implicitly – to “a theory of 
history” in one sense or the other. This of course does not 
mean that theorists of history necessarily develop a full-blown 
theory, be it a Skinnerian method or a postmodern theory of 
history. It only means that insofar as theorists of history enter 
the exchange of ideas, they at least presuppose one, contribute 
to one, or argue in favor or against one. For “a theory of history” 
is simply the purpose of the game. The most important thing to 
keep in mind when entering the exchange is not to confuse the 
expectations attached to one or the other sense of “a theory of 
history”, like it constantly happened throughout the last decades.
Now that the heyday of narrative philosophy of history 
and postmodern theory of history is over, now that a younger 
generation takes on the role of theorizing history against 
the backdrop of the experiential horizon of their own times, 
now that networks, centers, and hubs try to pull together 
the widely understood field of the theory and philosophy of 
history, the time is ripe for coming to terms with the question 
of what can reasonably be expected of what sort of “theory 
of history”. If, as I think, Ewa Domaska is right that today we 
need to develop theories of history adequate to address the 
global problems of our own times (DOMANSKA 2010), then 
it is equally important to have an idea of what such theories 
may be good for. This could be the first step towards a more 
fruitful relationship between the non-discipline of the theory 
and philosophy of history and the institutionalized disciplines 
whose paths it crosses, especially that of history. For the theory 
and philosophy of history is more than a collection of inherited 
concerns with the oftentimes mistaken ambitions of the last 
half-century. Today, it is what we are about to make out of it.
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